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Singapore is a critical security partner to the US in Southeast Asia. The US and Singapore share long-
standing military relations, with American forces making use of Singapore’s Naval Base facilities, 
contributing to peace and stabilizing efforts throughout the region, offering humanitarian assistance, 
and acting as a deterrent to potential security threats.1  US-Singaporean security cooperation also 
extends to bilateral exercises, joint military training activities, and cargo screening efforts. The 
importance of Singapore to biosecurity in Southeast Asia continues to grow, due to its rapid 
biotechnology growth, its leadership in biosafety training within the region, its experience in containing 
the pandemic of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS), as well as ongoing preparedness efforts 
related to new, emerging diseases.  
Given the importance of the Singapore-US relationship, and given the potential for naturally occurring or 
intentional biosecurity threats to emerge in the region, the UPMC Center for Health Security initiated 
the first-ever Track II biosecurity dialogue between the United States and Singapore. The dialogue is 
supported by the Project on Advanced Systems and Concepts for Countering WMD (PASCC), and 
sponsored by the US Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA).  The inaugural meeting was held in 
Washington, DC on June 10-11, 2014. The second meeting, which is the focus of this report, took place 
at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore on 
November 12-13, 2014.  
Between the first and second sessions of the dialogue, the global health and security communities 
experienced several biosecurity events of great significance. In June 2014, when the dialogue was 
initiated, the Ebola crisis in West Africa was just beginning to receive international attention; however, 
by November 2014, it had become a major global concern. At the June meeting, laboratory biosafety 
was discussed in terms of the previous laboratory acquired infections that took place during the severe 
acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) pandemic of 2003, as well in the context of theoretical risks 
associated with the so-called gain-of-function (GOF) research. However, just days after this meeting, 
several biosafety incidents occurred at US laboratories: the discovery of six vials of smallpox virus 
(dating from the 1950s) in a cold room operated by the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA); the 
accidental exposure of 75 people to anthrax at the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC); 
and the accidental cross-contamination of high- and low-pathogenic strains of avian influenza, which 
were subsequently shipped between CDC and the US Department of Agriculture.2,3 Dialogue participants 
shared perspectives about these events and a range of other important biosecurity-related issues, and 
also discussed implications for national and regional policy and programs going forward. 
Several important findings and observations came from the Singapore meeting:   
1. Both Singapore and the US dedicate significant resources toward preparedness for a range of 
biological threats. Given the frequency of epidemics, emerging infectious disease threats of 
national significance, and ongoing endemic threats throughout Southeast Asia, Singapore places 
heavy emphasis on preparing for naturally occurring infectious diseases. For example, Make 
Health Connect – a network of 1,200 clinics based in Singapore – has developed a disease map 
that offers live visualizations of infectious disease cases throughout the country, including 
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chickenpox, dengue fever, foot-and-mouth disease, and upper respiratory infections.4 
Singapore’s programs for deliberate biological threats are also an important part of its 
biopreparedness efforts. Singaporean health authorities have stockpiled enough smallpox 
vaccine for all of its population, including visitors.  The Ministry of Home Affairs performs 
environmental sampling for a range of biological threat agents at important points of crossing 
between Singapore and Malaysia. The US, too, has made substantial investments into preparing 
for naturally occurring infectious diseases and deliberate biological threats, having launched the 
Global Health Security Agenda (GHSA) earlier this year.  
 
2. Both the US and Singapore face challenges in communicating with the public during sustained 
infectious disease emergencies. Both public and media trust in the government’s ability to 
manage biological threats is likely greater in Singapore than in the US. Over the course of past 
outbreaks in Singapore, people have responded well to messages from political and health 
leaders. For example, open appeals to the public by the prime minister of Singapore during the 
SARS pandemic resulted in valuable public cooperation. Generally, the Singaporean public has 
followed government guidelines with little disagreement during past public health emergencies 
– a contrast to the current situation in the US, where the political, public and media response to 
Ebola has involved direct and contentious challenges to the authority of those leading response 
efforts. This difficult operating environment has exacerbated the complexity and demands of 
the US response to the epidemic. One trend that could complicate public communication and 
compromise trust in government during public health crises in Singapore is the growing 
importance of social media as a source of news and information. During crises, Singaporeans will 
have many more conduits for information and competing views than they have in the past, 
which could alter the dynamics of public health emergency response. Both countries can 
continue to learn from each other’s experiences in this realm.  
 
3. The US and Singapore can learn from each other’s preparedness efforts in response to the 
Ebola epidemic in West Africa. Ongoing concerns about Ebola—both in West Africa and the 
possibility for imported cases—have catalyzed preparedness efforts and have led to new 
response planning in both countries. Singaporean and US approaches to Ebola screening share 
several commonalities. Both support and benefit from the exit screening taking place in West 
Africa, and ask similar screening questions of passengers entering their airports from the region. 
Currently, there are very few travelers entering Singapore from West Africa, so it is unclear how 
frequently screening protocols will be tested there for the remainder of the epidemic. 
Singapore’s DSO National Laboratories have taken the lead on the diagnostic front, conducting 
confirmatory Ebola testing on samples originating from hospitals across the country. CDC has 
developed a diagnostic test in the US and disseminated it to US public health laboratories. Both 
countries have prepared detailed plans and dedicated health care facilities for managing 
patients with Ebola. While participants from both countries described a wide range of Ebola 
preparedness efforts related to this crisis, they also acknowledged the longer-term challenge of 
sustaining political attention from the highest levels of government for infectious disease 




4. Regional planning for infectious disease threats is critical to biopreparedness in Southeast 
Asia.  Singapore considers regional approaches to biological threats to be a high priority, given 
its close proximity to neighboring countries, large volume of trade, the high degree of mobility 
among people in the region, shared insect and animal reservoirs and threats, and close 
proximity to the origins of past epidemics. There are clear benefits to regional planning, 
including sharing of critical information and best practices, earlier detection of new outbreaks, 
joint approaches to specific disease control efforts, strong professional relationships to rely on 
during crises, and the possibility of shared costs. Regional bodies such as the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), of which Singapore is a member, seem to facilitate greater 
cooperation around threats of international consequence like Ebola. For example, ASEAN, with 
support from Japan’s International Cooperation System, launched an effort in 2006 to stockpile 
medical countermeasures and personal protective equipment in preparation for an influenza 
pandemic. Roughly half of these assets were stored in Singapore while the rest were pre-
positioned in the remaining ASEAN member states.5 Singaporean dialogue participants noted 
that such efforts helped allay public fears concerning influenza and helped promote a culture of 
collaboration among ASEAN nations. The US, too, sees the great importance in cooperatively 
addressing the important natural and deliberate biological threats and supports or participates 
in a number of efforts to improve bilateral and regional efforts in the region. 
 
5. There are key similarities and differences between American and Singaporean disease 
containment strategies. Both countries place high emphasis on diagnostic capabilities, disease 
surveillance, and new case identification. Both also have plans in place to safely isolate patients 
with highly contagious diseases, but neither has endorsed travel bans as a means of controlling 
epidemic disease transmission; in fact, a fundamental tenet of Singapore’s success in this realm 
is to keep people and goods moving freely even during public health emergencies. However, 
there are also important differences in disease containment practices. During the SARS 
outbreak, for example, Singaporean health authorities used in-home videos to ensure that 
suspected cases and their contacts remained at home, and further incentivized quarantine 
compliance by paying these individuals to make up for lost wages. Singaporean authorities also 
implemented fever screenings at airports, a measure not undertaken in the US. Though these 
authorities knew that few, if any, SARS cases would be detected this way, they acknowledged 
that such practices were important for maintaining the public’s confidence in the government 
during a public health crisis.     
 
6. Singapore’s approach to biosecurity and biosafety legislation and practice has much in 
common with US practices. Both nations have taken legislative and administrative steps to 
minimize the threats associated with biosafety breaches and the ramifications of gain-of-
function (GOF) research, respectively. Singapore’s Biological Agents and Toxins Act, 
administered by the Ministry of Health, is the primary legal mechanism for regulating the use 
and movement of potentially dangerous pathogens. Singaporean universities also retain 
biosafety committees that review all research taking place at their institutions; additionally, the 
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Singaporean government includes a Genetic Modification Advisory Committee that would 
oversee GOF experiments. In light of recent biosafety breaches, the US government has issued a 
moratorium on funding for GOF research in an effort to review biosecurity protocols and 
encourage scientists to promote stronger biosafety cultures at their laboratories. These reviews 
will be conducted by the National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity and the National 
Research Council of the National Academies. 
 
7. There is high perceived value in expanding the Singapore-US Biosecurity dialogue to include 
Malaysia and Indonesia. Given the proximity between Singapore and its neighbors, high levels 
of trade and travel within Southeast Asia, and shared biological threats throughout the region, 
there is great potential value in expanding the dialogue to include Malaysia and Indonesia, a 
step encouraged by the Singaporean dialogue participants. As a predicate to that, senior officials 
from Malaysia and Indonesia attended this meeting of the dialogue and made valuable 
contributions to the conversation. Participants at the November meeting also expressed interest 
in expanding future dialogue meetings to include additional Southeast Asian 
nations. Participants also suggested that valuable topics and activities for the expanded 2015 
dialogue that includes Malaysia and Indonesia could include a focused discussion and 
comparison of risk assessments for biological threats in the respective countries; tabletop 
exercises; and a more in-depth discussion of the impacts of biothreats on border security. All 
participants hoped to use these new forums and relationships as a platform to strengthen 






In June 2014, the UPMC Center for Health Security hosted the first-ever Track II biosecurity dialogue 
between the United States and Singapore. The second meeting of this dialogue took place in November 
2014, at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University, 
Singapore, and was supported by the Project on Advanced Systems and Concepts for Countering WMD 
(PASCC) of the Center on Contemporary Conflict, sponsored by the US Defense Threat Reduction Agency 
(DTRA). 
The November dialogue was attended by participants representing academia, government, and industry 
in the US and Singapore, as well as two delegates representing Malaysia and Indonesia. Speakers 
included experts in biosecurity, biosafety, global health security, policy, the life sciences, biodefense, 
and regional security. Building on the momentum of the first meeting, participants at the second 
meeting sought to further explore the challenges associated with combating emerging infectious 
diseases, to critique the policies and frameworks in place for responding to various biological threats, 
and to examine the dynamics of regional biosecurity in Southeast Asia. 
The meeting consisted of eight plenary sessions, each preceded by opening remarks delivered by select 
speakers. These remarks, in turn, set the stage for subsequent group dialogue. Broadly, topics of 
discussion included the relationships between biosecurity and homeland security, the threat of 
emerging infectious diseases, regional and international mechanisms for biosecurity engagement, 
multidisciplinary governmental approaches to biosecurity, the International Health Regulations and 
global health security, and national biosafety norms and capabilities. The sessions were preceded by 
keynote addresses delivered by Ambassador Ong Keng Yong, the Executive Deputy Chairman of RSIS, 
and Mr. Peter Ho, an adjunct professor at RSIS, senior advisor at the RSIS Centre for Strategic Futures, 
and a visiting scholar at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy. The meeting also featured a panel 
discussion led by the delegates from Malaysia and Indonesia. 
The dialogue proceeded with keen participation from all attendees. Both the participants and meeting 
observers were impressed with the quality and content of each session, and expressed hopes for 
continuing the dialogue at future meetings, as well as for engaging partners representing other 
Southeast Asian nations.  




Mr. Peter Ho 
Meeting Discussions 
Perspectives in Biosecurity: Remarks by Peter Ho 
 
The dialogue commenced with a keynote address delivered by Mr. Peter Ho Hak Ean, formerly the head 
of the Singapore Civil Service, the Permanent Secretary for Foreign Affairs, National Security and 
Intelligence Coordination, and Special Duties and Defence, who is now a visiting scholar at the Lee Kuan 
Yew School of Public Policy, adjunct professor at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), 
and senior advisor at the Centre for Strategic Futures, a division of the Office of the Prime Minister.    
 
Mr. Ho described how “black swan” events — high-impact crises that are difficult to predict — have 
shaped the unique biosecurity landscapes of different nations, and the way nations consider and 
prepare for future threats. For example, 
Singapore’s DSO National Laboratories began 
its work in chemical defense in 1979, following 
increasingly frequent reports of chemical 
weapons usage during conflict.6 These efforts 
eventually gave rise to DSO’s Biological 
Defence Program. DSO later constructed 
Singapore’s first BSL-3 laboratory, which today 
examines biological samples originating from 
all across Southeast Asia.  
 
Singapore’s most significant biosecurity 
black swan event was the severe acute 
respiratory syndrome (SARS) pandemic of 2003. On February 25, 2003, SARS infiltrated Singapore’s 
hospital system, resulting in shocking fatality rates and widespread fear among the public. Additionally, 
the surge in cases dealt a severe blow to the nation’s robust tourism industry, thereby generating major 
economic losses.  Mr. Ho cited the rapid proliferation of Chikungunya in Singapore and the ongoing 
outbreak of Ebola virus disease in West Africa as potential black swan events that would have 
destabilizing impacts. He reflected that nations should refrain from waiting for shocks like SARS, 
Chikungunya, and Ebola to manifest before taking preventive measures. Such complacency could enable 
emerging diseases to quickly become endemic or escalate into pandemics. Mr. Ho also identified climate 
change as biosecurity’s next major challenge, and urged dialogue participants to consider how to 
prepare for its consequences. Changing climates have already altered patterns of vector movement and 
disease transmission in the US, where dengue fever and Chikungunya have recently emerged in the 
south; and in Singapore, where dengue season grows progressively longer each year. 
 
Mr. Ho next addressed the challenges associated with learning lessons from past and current biosecurity 
threats, and shared various examples of approaches taken by Singapore in considering and preparing for 
future biological risks. Prominent among these challenges is the sense of denial that often follows major 
crises. Mr. Ho referred to this phenomenon as “collective cognitive dissonance,” and described how 
skewed perceptions of future biological risks condemn states to “repeat the painful lessons of the past.” 
Similarly, governments generally focus on solving immediate problems rather than solving future 




Mr. Ho next outlined potential strategies for overcoming the cognitive biases inherent in this form of 
reactive (as opposed to horizon-scanning) policymaking. When considering high-priority biosecurity 
issues, he underscored the importance of conducting tabletop exercises, citing a landmark exercise 
known as Dark Winter, which simulated the dynamics of emergency response in the US following a 
smallpox attack. Mr. Ho stressed that such exercises can reduce the shocks associated with black swan 
events and enhance states’ readiness to respond to future crises. Furthermore, policymakers who 
participate in such efforts remain sensitized to potential threats, help maintain political momentum on 
critical biosecurity issues, and are more likely to mobilize emergency funds and other resources in the 
event that a crisis manifests. In fact, after a careful review of Dark Winter, Singapore completed its own 
smallpox exercise, which informed policymakers’ decision to procure enough smallpox vaccines for all 
Singaporean residents and visitors. 
 
Preparedness for Biological Threats in Singapore and in the US 
Singapore, like the US, dedicates significant resources toward preparedness for biological threats. While 
Singapore focuses heavily on naturally occurring and emerging infectious diseases due to their ubiquity 
in the region, it also prepares for intentional biosecurity threats. One participant noted that Singapore’s 
wealth and strategic alliances can be construed as national security vulnerabilities, remarking, 
“Singapore is at risk, because it is a very rich country, surrounded by less well-off countries with 
extremist and militant cells harboring a grudge against the West… toward which Singapore is perceived 
as a close ally.” Singapore also considers itself vulnerable to infectious disease threats because it is 
densely populated; there is a high volume of trade and travel in the region, where many tropical 
diseases are endemic; there exist multiple reservoirs of infection and disease vectors; there is a high 
dependency on food imports; and the nation faces growing health threats posed by life in an 
increasingly built environment. As a result, Singapore has taken several measures to ensure the health 
and security of its population in the face of biological threats. Two significant examples of biosecurity 
preparedness commitments include having enough smallpox vaccines for all of its population (including 
visitors), and investing extensively in disease surveillance technologies at its borders.  
Describing border security as “the first line of defense for a safe Singapore,” representatives from 
Singapore’s Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) described the various technologies and surveillance 
strategies used to monitor the movement of disease at border checkpoints. Though Singapore is a small 
nation of roughly 5.4 million people, it has as many as 300,000 commuters daily who cross the 
Singaporean-Malaysia border.7 Last year alone saw some 15.5 million travelers entering the country, 
which creates a significant point of vulnerability to infectious disease outbreaks. MHA has developed 
tools intended to help provide early warning of infectious disease threats. These measures may include 
thermal screening, reviews of health declarations from inbound travelers, and “non-intrusive 
biosurveillance” air sampling techniques screening for influenza as well as agents of bioterrorism (e.g. 
plague, tularemia, smallpox, and anthrax), and emerging infectious pathogens like Ebola and the Middle 
East Respiratory Syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV). Singapore also relies on a network of BSL-2-ready, 
BSL-3-upgradable CBRN laboratories to rapidly identify pathogens of concern.   Singapore places great 
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emphasis on preparing for naturally occurring infectious diseases. For example, Make Health Connect – 
a network of 1,200 clinics based in Singapore – has developed a disease map that offers live 
visualizations of infectious disease cases throughout the country, including chickenpox, dengue fever, 
foot-and-mouth disease, and upper respiratory infections.4  
 
Communication about Disease Surveillance and Health Security Threats 
Singapore’s experience with SARS in 2003 was the most powerful factor in shaping future governmental 
responses to infectious disease threats. Singapore was aggressive in its response to SARS, establishing 
temperature screening at airports, serving quarantine orders to nearly 8,000 people, placing over 4,000 
individuals on daily telephone surveillance, and spending millions to bolster hospital capacity.8 SARS 
infected 238 Singaporeans, killing 33.8 Subsequent responses to other potential epidemics have been 
similarly extensive; for example, in response to the threat of MERS, Singapore has reinstated 
temperature checks for passengers arriving at Singapore’s airports from countries in the Middle East.9 
Additionally, hospitals in Singapore have developed strict infection control protocols for managing 
suspected cases of Ebola, and the Ministry of Health has instated a 21-day quarantine policy for Ebola-
positive individuals and their close contacts.10 
The lessons learned by the Singaporean government and public during the SARS pandemic have 
influenced the nation’s approach to other biothreats. Singapore recognized the seriousness of SARS 
early on, and authorities considered the problem to be a serious public security threat. It took the 
government of Singapore only 2 days to secure legal approval for its home quarantine orders. The Prime 
Minister also wrote an open letter petitioning the public to practice personal responsibility and respect 
quarantine orders. As the pandemic progressed, political will again played an important role in 
alleviating stigmatization of healthcare workers and their children: a messaging campaign led by the 
Prime Minister worked to convince the public that the health care workers were an integral part of the 
disease response, and should be supported rather than shunned.  
The SARS effort in Singapore was a whole–of-government response that adapted to the public’s 
concerns after painful experiences and lessons learned. Home Quarantine Orders (HQOs) were originally 
delivered by uniformed policemen; however, after complaints that their presence at people’s homes 
made it appear as though the residents had run afoul of the law, law enforcement authorities began 
dispatching plainclothes officers to perform this duty instead. Quarantine orders were further supported 
with follow-up contacts. All those quarantined received a home visit from a nurse along with a 
“quarantine kit” consisting of a thermometer and educational materials. Quarantined citizens also 
received a monetary allowance (roughly equal to the average Singaporean salary) to compensate for 
time not spent at work. The government also issued a S$230M ($132M USD) relief package for the 
hardest hit tourism and transport industries.11 These measures allowed business in Singapore to 
proceed nearly as usual, even in the midst of a public health crisis.  
Singapore also adapted its response to SARS based upon the community perception of risk. As described 
by the dialogue attendees, the SARS experience in Singapore featured a high “outrage factor” among 
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the general public that they would need to face such risks, which was heavily influenced by the novelty 
of the threat and the public’s perceived lack of control people over their personal safety. The approach 
developed for addressing community perceptions of risk has influenced Singapore’s response to Ebola in 
2014. While the likelihood of Ebola being imported into Singapore is perceived to be low, and there is 
confidence that Singapore’s hospital systems will be able to cope in the event of an imported case, the 
government has made concerted efforts to publicly address the threat of Ebola. Some of the lessons 
learned from SARS that have been applied to Ebola include the following rules: do not aim for zero fear 
in the public; acknowledge uncertainty and err on the side of alarm; be careful when making risk 
comparisons; tell people what you have done and what to expect; and give people things to do. 
Participants also discussed the value that some measures may have in mitigating public fears. One 
American participant stated that in the US, temperature screenings have been seen by public health 
officials as not worth the cost because they do not have a high likelihood of catching cases, but “that’s 
not how governors think. These practices are important in terms of liaising with the public. We 
underestimate how important they are.” Another point of difference is the issue of public respect and 
trust in government policies. Referring to American nurse who treated Ebola patients in Sierra Leone, 
returned to her home state of Maine, and defied an Ebola quarantine order by taking a bicycle ride 
outside – one Singaporean participant said, “Nobody in Singapore would ever ride a bike through their 
neighborhood if they were suspected of being sick with Ebola. It’s part of the culture.” 
 
Ebola and the Possibility of Imported Cases 
Participants reflected on the US response to imported cases of Ebola, and discussed how Singapore 
might respond to a similar situation. Comparing Singapore’s border concerns to US concerns, it was 
mentioned that while Canada could likely marshal resources to successfully treat Ebola cases and 
contain the spread of the disease, Mexico, however, would probably struggle to do the same. In 
considering the US response, several participants remarked that some of the CDC’s communications 
were detrimental to public confidence, particularly early claims that most American hospitals could 
handle an Ebola case. Still, they commended the US efforts to work with Liberia’s Ministry of Health in 
coordinating the response, commit funds towards improving the response, strengthening laboratory 
systems and Emergency Operations Centers (EOCs), augmenting healthcare workforces, refining health 
communications, and improving surveillance.  
Participants felt that the Singaporean government retains a good relationship with the media and 
maintains a culture of transparency when communicating with the public about risk. Yet while the 
media has in general a better relationship with the government in Singapore than in the US, there are 
generational shifts occurring in Singapore. Social media, in particular, has presented critical 
communication challenges. One participant commented, “How do we present messages as fast as 
possible—and accurately? In social media, you can present information quickly, but not necessarily 
accurately.” Another challenge is deciding what content to present. One participant remarked that 
disseminating information quickly via social media platforms is not the same as communicating 
effectively with the public. Participants stressed the need for more effective ways of evaluating the 
quality and framing of public health messages, as well as their mode of dissemination.   
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In response to the threat of Ebola, Singapore has instituted a visa requirement for travelers originating 
in Guinea, Sierra Leone, and Liberia, and cautioned citizens to avoid non-essential travel to affected 
areas throughout Africa.12 The US has imposed similar measures, requiring incoming travelers from 
Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea to enter through one of five designated airports and undergo fever 
screenings. Select states, however, have mandated that healthcare workers returning from West Africa 
be quarantined for 21 days. One participant stated that travel bans may at best delay importations of 
cases, but will not prevent them entirely. Some in the US have argued that delaying travelers would give 
countries more time to prepare, while others argue that the money saved by not instituting a ban could 
be used immediately to strengthen existing systems and protocols. However, this is likely to be a 
persistent point of disagreement between and within nations.  
Ongoing concerns about Ebola—both in terms of emerging cases in West Africa and the possibility of 
imported cases elsewhere—have catalyzed preparedness efforts in both the US and Singapore. There 
are opportunities for both nations to share disease containment strategies and learn from each other’s 
efforts to prepare for emerging biothreats. While trust in government is considerably higher in 
Singapore than in the US – which gives rise to differences in the way emergency preparedness planning 
is conducted in both countries – there are generational differences heralded by social media that will 
create new challenges in Singapore. Singaporean participants conveyed that younger Singaporeans 
expect and demand greater transparency in government decision-making, which will affect 
preparedness and response efforts during epidemics of the aftermath of bioterrorism event.  
 
Regional Approaches to Addressing Biological Threats 
The ongoing Ebola crisis demonstrates the need to build response capabilities at the regional level.  
Participants commented that one of the aftereffects of SARS was that “the value of human life shifted in 
the region,” leading to greater awareness and importance placed upon public health. Also, the epidemic 
“underscored the need for a regional approach to biosecurity” as diseases can spread from one country 
to another. In discussing infectious disease emergency response, participants from both sides stated 
that at present, they would “expect countries to respond individually.” However, based on the metrics 
specified in the International Health Regulations (IHR), there is considerable variance in nations’ 
surveillance and response capacities; in fact, the vast majority lack the core public health capacities 
needed to detect and respond to infectious disease threats. This indicates a striking level of under-
preparedness globally, regardless of whether an outbreak of disease results from a naturally occurring 
pathogen, a laboratory accident, or a deliberate attack.  
The IHR has 196 party states. In June 2012, countries were required to report to WHO on the progress of 
their core capacity achievements in specified public health competencies. Only 42 nations reported that 
they had fully achieved these capacities, and 118 successfully submitted an extension request with a 
plan of action. In June 2014, countries reported again; while the numbers have not been publicly 
released, it is likely that many nations have yet to achieve the core capacities. Even for those nations 
that have achieved a certain level of capacity on paper, real-world challenges for implementing and 
sustaining their public health systems remain. Furthermore, there is no penalty for a nation failing to 
13 
 
build public health capacity. As a result, WHO depends on its authority to publicly request nations to 
enhance their capacities – thereby effectively “naming and shaming” non-compliant party states – to 
enforce the provisions of IHR.13 
The GHSA is an effort between the US government, 44 other nations, and leading international 
organizations that aims to make the world safe and secure from infectious disease threats. Nations 
supporting the GHSA are encouraged to participate in one of eleven “Action Packages,” which consist of 
commitments targeted toward specific GHSA objectives. GHSA countries are free to pursue these 
commitments at the national, regional, or global levels.14 Participants at the dialogue observed that 
“there seems to be a strong sense of regional vulnerabilities,” in public health infrastructure, and so 
countries committed to the GHSA have begun to partner with neighboring nations to focus on regional 
weak links. Another participant commented that such collaborations are beneficial for all parties 
involved, remarking, “We can learn a lot from how smaller countries have harnessed all their resources 
to promote collaboration across all disciplines” which leads to greater efficiencies. 
The need for enhanced regional capacities to respond to disease threats extends to laboratory services. 
Participants noted that diagnostic capabilities must also be expanded and coordinated to ensure that 
the healthcare, public health, and research communities produce coherent responses to infectious 
disease emergencies. Such emergencies often present opportunities for health officials to collect data 
that could be used to mitigate the crisis at hand, as well as plan ahead for future contingencies. 
However, the rapid nature of most public health crises often prevents scientists and health authorities 
from capitalizing on such opportunities. For example, one participant noted that “we lost an opportunity 
to understand SARS super spreaders”-- those individuals who, when infected, transmitted the disease to 
unusually high numbers of people. A lack of research plans for such a contingency resulted in critical 
information gaps in the health and security communities’ understanding of the dynamics of SARS 
disease transmission.   
Since disease can spread beyond national borders to affect regions very quickly, participants discussed 
the merits of establishing well-defined protocols for mobilizing funds, personnel, and resources prior to 
an emergency. Such measures exist in the nuclear community, as was observed by one participant, but 
are absent for biological threats. Given that there is no equivalent of a security exigency equivalent for 
biological threats, engaging nations in committing resources regionally to combat such threats remains a 
challenge. Still, dialogue attendees nevertheless affirmed the necessity and importance of regional 
approaches to biosecurity. As one American participant remarked, “We in the US need to be in dialogue 
with the countries around us—our defenses are only as good as the weakest link in the global chain.”  
Participants also noted that while the science and technology required to make biological weapons is 
quite accessible, “we don’t see a lot of people doing it.” Most agreed, however, that this is not a 
consequence of the difficulty of creating bioweapons, citing the relative ease with which the Rajneeshee 
cult poisoned salad bars in the US in 1984. One individual speculated that perhaps the reluctance to use 
bioweapons might have something to do with the perception of the morality of using biological agents 
as weapons. If that is the case, the normative actions of international treaties, statements of regional 
political affiliations, and dialogues between nations reinforce the non-biological weapons norm. This 
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underscores the importance of the Biological Weapons Convention (to which both Singapore and the US 
are members) as well as the UN Security Resolution 1540 (UNSCR 1540), which obligates signatory 
states to take measures against the proliferation of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear 
weapons, and thereby prevent non-state actors from acquiring such weapons of mass destruction. 
Substantive government action on public health problems requires a multi-sectoral approach, and a 
deliberate framing of the non-health consequences of inaction. In both Singapore and the United States, 
public health issues must often be framed in non-public health terms (i.e. threats to the nation’s 
economy or security) to garner attention from the highest levels of government. Participants from both 
nations agreed that there are opportunities for shared action on mutually important public health 
challenges.  
A great deal of the discussion centered around how public health is perceived and acted upon in other, 
non-public health contexts; for example, if a public health crisis is also seen as a national security threat, 
or as a threat to trade or commerce sectors, more decisive action is taken to resolve the public health 
problem. Public health actions in these contexts, however, take on greater political meaning in these 
typically, larger scenarios.  
Some participants felt that some in the US government and state governments believe that Ebola is a 
challenge that requires a strong response from CDC, NIH, and possibly federal immigration authorities, 
but that other government agencies need not be centrally involved.  Participants from both Singapore 
and the US agreed that infectious disease crises like Ebola generate cascading effects that extend to all 
areas of government and all aspects of governance. The US response to Ebola stands in stark contrast to 
its earlier response to the threat of pandemic influenza. In the response to 2009 H1N1 and in the whole-
of-government preparations that preceded that epidemic, there was a great deal of engagement across 
government sectors in the US. Now, however, “nobody in the USG believes they should be in charge of 
Ebola.” Another participant agreed, saying that “Ebola remained a health issue [versus a national 
security issue] for far too long – it didn’t reach the White House until six months into the outbreak.” 
Key challenges remain for such whole-of-government approaches to disease, regardless of whether the 
event is in Singapore or in the US. Different agencies retain different standard operating procedures, use 
different language, or assign different meanings to operating terms depending on the agency involved. 
One participant remarked, “People can use the same terminology, but they might be hearing different 
things”.   
Still, past crises that have required multi-sectoral responses have led to   enhanced preparedness now.  
As one participant noted, “In Singapore, we have gone through multiple crises in the health arena – 
SARS, dengue, preparedness for Ebola, influenza. These have all brought all the government sectors 
together….In a crisis situation, there tends to be greater collaboration because there is a common goal 
or a common enemy to fight against.”  During a crisis, it is easier to get stakeholders to volunteer, build 
networks, and to repurpose equipment, personnel, and resources. However, after crises abate, 
sustaining needed investments in preparedness – e.g. building facilities, enhancing laboratory 
capabilities, and buying equipment – remains challenging.  
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Both Singapore and the US appear to be taking similar, interdisciplinary approaches to biosecurity and 
public health. Participants agree that the most progress is made when public health officials conduct 
outreach to the various arms of government and society that don’t regularly engage in public health. 
Oftentimes the stumbling blocks to an effective response during public health emergencies emerge in 
influential non-health sectors. Therefore, one participant advised that public health officials would do 
well to frame public health issues in non-health contexts to maintain engagement from non-health 
sectors. He also emphasized that 70% of emerging diseases now are zoonotic and there is a need to 
break down barriers between the agricultural, veterinary, and health sectors. 
 
The Role of ASEAN 
Another potential regional approach for Singapore is to involve the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN). ASEAN is a regional organization founded in 1967 whose member states today include 
Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, the Philippines, Brunei, Laos, Myanmar (Burma), Brunei, and 
Vietnam. Its primary aim is to enhance regional cooperation in the realms of trade and economic 
growth, cultural development, social progress, promoting peace and regional stability, and education.15 
Participation in ASEAN depends on the country; usually, there is an in-kind financial contribution by 
states. Involvement in ASEAN is thought to promote transparency among regional partners, as nations 
“have a better sense of what Country A might be facing.” Without such a framework, it was mentioned, 
it would be harder to encourage countries to work together on pressing problems. The ASEAN 
framework encourages states to help each other on health security issues, as an outbreak in one country 
presents a threat to the whole region. One participant remarked, “There is a deep sense of shared 
vulnerabilities in the region. You hear that at the top and at the bottom – you are all interconnected. It’s 
easy to convince policymakers that they should act on certain things – otherwise my insecurity becomes 
your insecurity.” ASEAN’s forays into health security matters are still early, and the effectiveness of the 
organization’s work in the space remains to be determined; during SARS, their role was more passive.16 
ASEAN has no mandatory assistance requirements, and some acknowledged that its deliberations can at 
times move slowly. One participant noted that ASEAN has been more effective in promoting a 
collaborative approach to addressing non-biological threats. Responses to natural disasters, for 
example, have been swift and regional. In January last year, an ASEAN Track-1 dialogue was focused on 
global response mechanisms for emergencies. However, the infectious disease contingency of ASEAN 
remains less agile in formulating similarly effective regional responses. 
ASEAN has successfully dealt with some biosecurity issues, such stockpiling medical countermeasures. 
Some countries were reluctant to stockpile smallpox vaccines, for example, because of the cost. “But,” 
one Singaporean attendee shared, “Malaysia and Singapore decided that we had to do it to allay public 
fears…In ASEAN, some of the less-developed economies think stockpiling is unnecessary – it is very 
expensive to create and maintain a stockpile. But overall, this was a good exercise for ASEAN’s culture – 




Biosafety and Biosecurity Practice 
In addition to discussing naturally occurring biological threats, dialogue participants explored the 
biosecurity risks inherent in scientific research and laboratory practice. Recent biosafety breaches in the 
US and Singapore have underscored the importance of enhancing biosafety as a means of minimizing 
biosecurity vulnerabilities in both nations. The CDC, for example, has come under scrutiny for a number 
of mishaps at its laboratory facilities. In June 2013, CDC reported that one of its labs neglected to 
adequately inactivate live cultures of anthrax, resulting in the exposure of some 75 staff to the 
potentially deadly bacteria. All those exposed received protective courses of antibiotics and were 
monitored for symptoms following the accidental exposure.2 Then, in July, CDC reported that a sample 
of low-pathogenicity H9N2 influenza virus was accidentally contaminated with high-pathogenicity H5N1 
virus. The contaminated samples were subsequently transported to a facility at the Department of 
Agriculture before the error was discovered.17 In the same month, vials containing viable samples of 
variola virus were found at the National Institutes of Health (NIH) campus, in a laboratory operated by 
the Food and Drug Administration. Over the course of subsequent inspections of other government 
laboratories, investigators discovered improperly stored samples of other dangerous select agents, 
including ricin and Yersinia pestis, the bacteria that cause plague. In response to these events, Dr. 
Thomas Frieden, the director of CDC, ordered reviews of biosafety culture, protocols, and personnel at 
CDC, and assembled an external team of experts to advise CDC on future courses of action. Additionally, 
NIH ordered a comprehensive sweep of all its laboratories and declared September 2014 to be “National 
Biosafety Stewardship Month,” during which its grantees and contractors were encouraged to review 
their respective biosafety practices and conduct inventories of laboratory samples. 
Singapore, too, has experienced consequential lapses in biosafety in the past. During the 2003 SARS 
pandemic, for example, the country reported an isolated case of the disease resulting from an accident 
at a BSL-3 laboratory at the National University of Singapore. The patient, a doctoral student, was 
infected with a strain of the SARS coronavirus that had been cross-contaminated with a sample of West 
Nile virus.18 Upon inspecting the facility in question, Singapore’s Environmental Health Institute 
identified numerous structural deficits and reported insufficient training amongst laboratory workers; 
ultimately, the inspectors recommended that the facility address these deficiencies, implement stricter 
recordkeeping protocols, and undergo an external audit before reopening.19 
Both nations experience the challenge of maintaining laboratory safety and reducing insider threats 
while still promoting science. As one participant noted, “we don’t want to stifle scientific creativity by 
over-regulating and ensuring compliance with protocols – we need to get people to actually think about 
risk as they work instead of doing things blindly.” 
Reporting biosafety mishaps also remains challenging. In the US, biosafety accidents are required to be 
reported for all incidents involving select agents, just like in Singapore. In fact, in Singapore, every high-
risk experiment has to be registered with the government to ensure that, in the event of accidental 
exposure, first responders are aware of the specific infectious threat in question, and can inform 
hospitals ahead of time. Like the US, Singapore has created mechanisms for reporting incidents to 
university research authorities, as well as to MOH and the Ministry of Manpower. However, participants 
from both countries acknowledged that lessons learned from biosafety breaches are not widely shared. 
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Lessons are shared internally within individual labs for the most part, and are not promulgated unless 
the incident is particularly severe. 
 
Perspectives from Indonesia and Malaysia 
Delegates from Malaysia and Indonesia -- Dr. Chong Chee Kheong, Director of the Disease Control 
Division of the Malaysian Ministry of Health; and Dr. Daniel Tjen, Surgeon General of the Indonesian 
Armed Forces. -- were invited to this meeting of the dialogue to bring in  the perspectives of additional, 
strategic players in the region, and to further strengthen participants’ understanding of the regional 
dynamics of biosecurity in Southeast Asia. Drs. Chong and Tjen provided attendees with an overview of 
biosecurity practice and policy in their respective countries, and identified potential areas of further 
exploration and future collaboration. Building on the success of the US-Singapore Strategic Dialogue on 
Biosecurity, the UPMC Center for Health Security plans to expand the existing framework into a Track II 
multilateral dialogue, adding Malaysia and Indonesia to the US-Singapore contingent in 2015. 
Given that Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia are geographical neighbors, members of the Association 
of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and partners in trade, defense, and health, relations between the 
three are of strategic consequence in the Southeast Asian region. Key sociopolitical, economic, and 
cultural differences exist between these nations. Singapore is a small, high-income nation with a 
population of 5.4 million people and a gross domestic product of $297.9 billion (USD) in 2013.20 
Indonesia, by contrast, is a lower-middle-income nation (GDP $868.3 billion) with the world’s fourth-
highest population (249.9 million).21 Malaysia is an upper-middle-income nation (GDP $312.4 billion) 
with a population of 29.72 million people. Singapore is considered to be the most religiously diverse of 
the three nations (though it has a Buddhist majority), retains a large expatriate population, and is 
shaped by cultural and political influences from the West. 22 Malaysia and Indonesia, meanwhile, are 
predominantly Muslim countries and are home to large Malay, Chinese, Japanese, and Sundanese 
populations. Singapore and Malaysia are both affiliated with the World Health Organization’s (WHO) 
Western Pacific Regional Office, while Indonesia belongs to WHO’s Southeast Asian Regional Office. All 
three nations are represented in the Asia Pacific Biosafety Association, though Malaysia and Indonesia 
maintain their own in-country biosafety organizations. 
During the meeting, Dr. Chong outlined Malaysia’s approach to biosecurity, describing a spectrum of 
biological threats ranging from naturally occurring disease outbreaks to deliberate uses of biological 
weapons. As an adopter of UNSCR 1540, Malaysia recently submitted a progress report affirming its 
ability to fulfill the mandates of the Resolution, and has offered assistance to other states seeking to do 
so.23 Malaysia is also a party to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), has enacted 
numerous laws in support of the Convention, and hopes to pass new legislation to further support BTWC 
and UNSCR 1540 implementation. However, the Malaysian government has encountered difficulties in 
passing the legislation (which was originally prepared in 2011), and has struggled to solicit buy-in from 
academic researchers, who harbor concerns that it could constrain their work.24 The Malaysian 
government employs an interagency approach to biosecurity, with the Ministries of Health, Defence, 
and Natural Resources & Environment responsible for devising biosafety and biosecurity policy, 
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fostering collaboration with international partners, and conducting risk assessments for safe usage of 
biotechnology, respectively. Additionally, the Department of Standards has developed biosafety and 
biocontainment protocols for laboratories, while the Malaysian Biosafety and Biosecurity Association 
organizes international workshops and seminars in support of safe laboratory practices. Dr. Chong also 
addressed Malaysia’s future biosecurity priorities, highlighting increased interagency cooperation, 
exercises involving all levels of industry, academia, and government, strengthening national capacities in 
preparedness and response, and enhancing collaboration with international partners.  
Dr. Tjen followed with a description of Indonesia’s biosafety and biosecurity infrastructure. He 
underscored emerging and re-emerging infectious diseases – notably, malaria, tuberculosis, dengue 
fever, avian influenza, anthrax, plague, Hantavirus, Nipah virus, and rickettsiosis – as persisting 
problems. Indonesia also faces challenges in enhancing laboratory safety and security at the national 
level in a sustainable way, and is working to strengthen BSL-2 capabilities nationwide. The gravity of 
these threats is accentuated in part by the presence of several extremist groups across the country, 
including Jamaah Anshorut Tauhid (an Al-Qaeda sympathizer), Negara Islam Indonesia (a sympathizer of 
the Islamic State), and Jamaah Islamiah. Dr. Tjen also highlighted the prominent role played by the 
Indonesian military in responding to national health emergencies, noting the military’s strengths in 
logistics management, communication, and resource mobilization. Another dialogue participant (also 
from Indonesia), added that the military enjoys a high degree of respect from the public, given its 
“instrumental role” in securing the nation’s independence. Still, Dr. Tjen noted that communication 
between the military and civilian sectors remains weak, and that the military is often excluded from 
whole-of-society planning for biosecurity emergencies. 
Notably, both Dr. Chong and Dr. Tjen cited outreach to local leaders and non-governmental partners as 
important components of enhancing biosecurity in their respective countries. In Malaysia, for example, 
mobile clinics and “flying doctor” clinics enhance healthcare delivery among hard-to-reach populations, 
while volunteers play important roles in managing the country’s burden of non-communicable diseases. 
Malaysia has also enlisted practitioners of traditional medicine in healthcare delivery efforts to further 
penetrate hard-to-reach populations. General increases in health literacy in Malaysia have facilitated 
these efforts, as such populations increasingly subscribe to modern medical treatment. Additionally, the 
Indonesian government has collaborated with stakeholders in academia and the private stakeholders to 
formulate a Code of Conduct on Biosecurity, and also works with provincial- and district-level leaders to 
enhance military integration into local preparedness efforts. 
 
Next Steps 
The next dialogue, which will likely include Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and the United States, will 
tentatively be held in Washington, DC in June, 2015. Thinking ahead to that meeting, participants 
discussed possible agenda topics and activities for that meeting. Some suggested that one important 
goal would be to include a focused discussion and comparison of risk assessments for biological threats 
in the respective countries. 
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Participants agreed that a more thorough discussion of border issues would likewise be useful. There 
was great interest in having a more detailed discussion about options for detection and response to 
biological threats at each nation’s respective borders. Singaporean participants said that they would be 
interested in understanding better how the US would coordinate with Canada and Mexico, should a 
regional biosecurity event occur.  
Many participants were also enthusiastic about undertaking a biosecurity themed tabletop exercise at a 
future meeting. Participants agreed that such exercises can be very effective ways to draw out potential 
gaps in preparedness and potential problems with coordination during biosecurity emergencies. While 
regional coordination seemed to be a shared goal, there are many obstacles which could potentially be 
highlighted and addressed during future discussions and tabletop exercises.  A US participant offered 
that it would be likewise useful to explore case studies in order to discern lessons learned. Agreeing, a 
Singaporean participant suggested that the group jointly identify specific gaps in preparedness that 
could be addressed in the dialogue. 
Some participants also urged the group to consider the inclusion of additional countries in the Asia-
Pacific region. Others acknowledged the value of doing so, but expressed the hope that the group did 
not expand too quickly so that participants would not lose the near term ability to more deeply 
understand the approaches, challenges, and views of those countries already engaged in the dialogue. 
One participant encouraged the group to consider developing actual policy recommendations, when 
appropriate. 
All participants agreed that the biosecurity dialogue is an excellent forum to develop long-lasting 
relationships that can collectively bean effective platform to strengthen biosecurity in the US and in the 
Asia-Pacific region.  
 
About RSIS  
RSIS traces its origins to 1996 when it was originally established as the Institute of Defence and Strategic 
Studies. In January 2007, the Institute was designated as an autonomous school within Nanyang 
Technological University, and evolved into a leading academic center for the study of international 
affairs. Today, RSIS consists of six centers dedicated to examining issues that affect the security and 
stability of the Asia Pacific region: the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, the International 
Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research, the Centre for Excellence for National Security, the 
Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies, the Temasek Foundation Centre for Trade & Negotiations, 
and the Centre for Multilateralism Studies. RSIS collaborates internationally with other schools 





Appendix A: Agenda 
 
Singapore–US Strategic Dialogue on Biosecurity 
 
November 11, 2014 
 
19:00-21:00 Welcome Dinner (by invitation only) 




Lecture Theatre, Student Wing 
S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) 
Block S3.1, Level B3 
50 Nanyang Avenue, Singapore 639798 
 
 
November 12, 2014 
  
08:00-08:15 US Participants meet at Marriott Hotel lobby, to be transported to RSIS 
09:00-09:30 Participants arrive at RSIS, coffee/tea (Reception Area) 
  
09:30-10:00 Welcome and Introductions  
Ambassador ONG Keng Yong 
Executive Deputy Chairman, RSIS 
 
Dr. Tom INGLESBY 
Chief Executive Officer and Director, UPMC Center for Health Security 
 
Dr. Gigi GRONVALL 




Mr. Peter HO 
Visiting Scholar, Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy 
Adjunct Professor, RSIS 
Senior Advisor, Centre for Strategic Futures 
Former Head, Singapore Civil Service 
Former Permanent Secretary for Foreign Affairs, National Security and Intelligence 
Coordination, Special Duties and Defence  
10:00-10:15 Coffee Break 
  
10:15-11:15 Session 1: Biosecurity Through the Lens of Homeland Security 
 
Exploration of how biosecurity preparedness has enhanced homeland security in 
Singapore and the US, from upstream monitoring of state of the art technologies to 
21 
 
downstream implementation and deployment of feasible technologies. In Singapore, 
how have these technologies been deployed to meet Singapore’s homeland security 
needs and also to serve as a reference point for regional learning? For the US, how has 
the homeland security role of the laboratory and other biosecurity assets changed over 
the past decade? 
 
Opening Remarks: Dr. LEE Fook Kay and Dr. Jim LE DUC 
  
11:15-12:30 Session 2: Ebola and Emerging Infectious Diseases 
 
The continuing Ebola crisis will be reflected on, with a discussion of how Singapore and 
the US have responded. There will be a specific examination of what the US or Singapore 
might do in the event of increased Ebola importations or an outbreak in a neighboring 
country. Lessons learned thus far for the US and Singapore will be discussed, as well as 
the role of the media in communications regarding infectious disease threats. 
 





13:30-15:15 Session 3: Asia-Pacific Regional Contingencies for Biosecurity: The Role of 
Regional Bodies and International Organizations 
 
This session will focus on areas where Singapore and the US may work together to 
resolve regional contingencies with biosecurity implications. This discussion will also 
consider the role of collaborative relationships among scientists, public health 
practitioners, and the security community, with an emphasis on discussing the role of 
regional bodies such as ASEAN and APEC and the regional presence of international 
organizations (WP and SEA regional WHO offices, and the Asia Pacific Strategy for 
Emerging Diseases).  
 
Opening Remarks: Mr. KWA Chong Guan and Dr. Seth CARUS 
 
Briefing: Dr. Mely CABALLERO-ANTHONY 
  
15:15-15:30 Coffee Break 
15:30-16:45 Session 4: Regional Panel 
 
Dr. CHONG Chee Kheong and Dr. Daniel TJEN will present biosecurity perspectives 
from their countries. In particular, their remarks will address regional preparedness and 
realities of biosecurity threats, with a focus on active regional militant groups that may 
be considering using biological weapons. 
  
16:45-17:00 Group Photo (by RSIS photographer) 
  
18:00-21:00 Dinner (by invitation only) 
Quentin’s Eurasian Restaurant 
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08:00-08:15 US Participants meet at Marriott Hotel lobby, to be transported to RSIS 
  
09:00-09:30 Participants arrive at RSIS, coffee/tea (Reception Area) 
  
09:30-10:45 Session 5: Biosecurity and Multidisciplinary Governmental Approaches 
 
In this session, the participants will discuss the challenges and opportunities to enhance 
biosecurity preparedness in a necessarily multisector approach (health, defense, 
homeland security, science and technology, industry), from the perspectives of 
Singapore and the US. In addition, there will be a discussion of nongovernment 
dimensions, such as the roles and responsibilities of traditional and social media, as well 
as the private health sector and NGOs. 
 
Opening Remarks: Dr. Vernon LEE and Dr. Kenneth BERNARD 
  
10:45-11:00 Coffee Break 
  
11:00-12:30 Session 6: International Health Regulations: Strengthening Capacities, Lessons 
from Ebola 
 
Building on the previous meeting’s discussion on public health and the global health 
security agenda, this session will focus on approaches to strengthening international 
compliance with the International Health Regulations, health system preparedness in 
regional countries, and a discussion of how progress can be measured. What are the 
most valuable contributions the US and Singapore can make to this effort?  
 




13:30-15:00 Session 7: Biosafety and Developing National Norms and Capabilities 
 
This session will focus discussion on recent biosafety events and mishaps and will 
discuss strategies in Singapore and the US to focus attention on safety. How can 
policymakers be engaged in discussions about biosafety progress? 
 
Opening Remarks: Dr. CHUA Teak-Mean, Dr. Barbara JOHNSON, and Dr. Gigi 
GRONVALL 
  
15:00-15:15 Coffee Break 
  
15:15-16:45 Session 8: Wrap-up and Discussion on Expanding the Dialogue 
 
The concluding session will solicit suggestions for specific people and areas of expertise 
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